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Abstract
The paper addresses the remembrance of events surrounding the restoration of Lithuanian indepen-
dence, as well as their repercussions on the present, concentrating on the younger generation that 
does not have ﬁ rst-hand experience of the period and, therefore, has to rely on other people’s accounts, 
textbooks, and other sources.
If one considers the state and, especially, its social (or communal) dimension as impossible totalities, 
memory and history acquire signiﬁ cant importance as they both provide ‘a magma of signiﬁ cations’, out 
of which particular signifying structures are instituted in order to anchor meaning and exhort a unifying 
claim through dominant narratives that tend to subjugate the otherwise inevitable variety of discourses. 
The discourse of the Lithuanian history textbooks is analysed by outlining its emphasis on unity and self-
sacriﬁ ce in 1988-1991, and by portraying the Lithuanian history as an unending struggle against enemies 
and their malevolent plots. Also, considering the accounts of young people, two tendencies are visible: 
ﬁ rst, a bias towards images of unity and self-sacriﬁ ce depicting the period concerned, second, the pre-
dilection to employ the categories of ‘aliens’ and ‘enemies’ is evident, signiﬁ cantly aﬀ ecting perceptions 
of the present with widespread images of disintegration and decay in the absence of the Other.
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This article explores the social modes of remembering and interpreting the restoration of Lithuanian 
independence, as well as the period immediately before and afterwards, that prevail among young 
people, with a special focus on the discourse of history textbooks and its eﬀ ects on young people. In 
general, during the years after the breakup of the Soviet Union and the fall of the communist bloc, 
there has been a signiﬁ cant amount of scholarship on social memory and political imaginaries of 
post-communist transformation, including its eﬀ ects on youths. However, the Lithuanian scholarship 
on this subject has unduly ignored young citizens, born around the time of independence. Instead, 
it has mostly concentrated on the older generations and the eﬀ ects that the occupation and post-
independence transformations had on them. This lack of attention is even more paradoxical given the 
recent rise of far-right and ultra-nationalist sentiments among young people in Lithuania. As a result, 
an attempt must be made to elucidate several important trends in the narratives of Lithuanian inde-
pendence and nationhood that prevail among the younger generation. Also, connections are sought 
with the broader spectrum of research on transformations in post-communist Europe, in particular 
post-colonial approaches, analyses of myth-making, nostalgias and reinventions of the self, and at-
tempts at comparative textbook analyses in the region.
To begin with, the importance of memory is strengthened since it is the symbolic centre around 
which the social structure is constructed, as well as that which hides the very impossibility of the 
social (understood here as the sum of interpersonal and intergroup relations that provide the state 
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with the feeling of an obvious, homogeneous, and integrated whole, in essence, the fabric of the 
state), thus covering the unavoidable lack that is at the heart of the social itself. Common memories 
justify and structure the social while also being its products; therefore, neither of the two could be 
analysed separately, but only through their constant interaction. However, there is never a democratic 
equality of memories within a state. Certain images and patterns of remembering, solidiﬁ ed into 
coherent narratives, occupy dominant positions, while others, depending on their degree of diﬀ erence 
from the dominant ones, either are subordinated or become counter-narratives, i.e. proto-centres of 
resistance. In either case, these narratives explain the present, make it non-contingent, and justify the 
lives of those who subscribe to them. This is also why it is particularly rewarding to study stories of 
the past, narrated by those who are unable to remember the events themselves and, therefore, depend 
on mediations and interpretations.
The ﬁ rst part of the article introduces an approach to collective memory that is heavily based 
on psychoanalysis and the critical theories of hegemony. Collective memory is seen here as at once 
an unconscious urge towards stable signiﬁ cation and an attempt of the elites to establish meaning 
and preserve the status quo. This allows a better understanding of why some images are chosen 
and others are not, as well as how they are instituted as dominant ones. The second part employs 
an analysis of the discourse of Lithuanian history textbooks. The article traces the dominant images 
of self-victimisation, the formation of national enemies, and the quintessential mobilisation against 
the malevolent ‘others’ of the modern period, i.e. after the restoration of independence. Finally, the 
third part concentrates on the results of a qualitative survey of young people (born between 1988 
and 1992) conducted by the author between February and April 2011 and intended to bring forward 
the dominant accounts of the events surrounding the restoration of Lithuanian independence. The 
semi-structured interviews were conducted in writing in order to bring forward more coherent and 
thought out accounts. These interviews clearly show a worldview based on dichotomies between the 
‘own’ and the ‘alien’, as well as a widespread feeling of resentment and decay due to a loss of national 
unity and integrity.
The imaginary institution
It is useful to begin the analysis of social memory with the French psychoanalyst thinker Jacques 
Lacan, for whom the subject and the social are based on a lack, an antagonism and are, therefore, 
fundamentally incomplete. For him, the ego is born in the mirror stage, i.e. the period of fascination 
with one’s own image. This image, however, is taken for a reality; it stands in for the illusory wholeness 
that the subject will constantly strive for in the future. Therefore, the function of the ego is that of 
misrecognition, of bringing supposed coherence and mastery through imaginary identiﬁ cations, of a 
refusal to accept the fragmentation and alienation of the subject. It is a key function of the ego to 
try to cover the lack, the displacement central to the subject and enable discourse as such (Lacan 
1977). The realm of the imaginary, however, is still pre-linguistic. When one encounters language, 
one enters the symbolic order, which already makes the subject occupy certain pre-existing positions 
because the subject itself “is this emergence which, just before, as subject, was nothing, but which, 
having scarcely appeared, solidiﬁ es into a signiﬁ er” (Lacan 1994: 199). Among these positions there are 
none that would ﬁ t the subject completely, leaving an ineradicable lack or excess. What is more, in 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, the symbolic order, i.e. the level of law, ideology, communication, language, 
and exchange of meaning is itself incomplete or partial. As a result, there is always something left 
over, something that resists symbolisation and is impossible to express, namely, the real. Therefore, 
the alienation of the subject is not alienation from something – alienation is the very essence of being, 
even though we constantly struggle for wholeness, unity, coherence, and fulﬁ lment (Homer 2005).
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Meaning, therefore, holds on partial ﬁ xations, master signiﬁ ers that quilt the levels of the signiﬁ er 
and the signiﬁ ed, temporarily stopping the sliding of the latter, with the nation being one of them 
(as well as ‘order’, ‘unity’, ‘liberation’, ‘revolution’, etc.). It is the very partiality of this quilting, the 
incompleteness and openness of the social that allows a hegemonic practice (Laclau & Mouﬀ e 2001), 
that is “the presentation of a particularity of a group as the incarnation of that empty signiﬁ er which 
refers to the communitarian order as an absence, an unfulﬁ lled reality” (Laclau 2007: 44). The people 
are provided with a nation, an order, a revolution, a liberation etc., but by ﬁ lling the signiﬁ er with a 
particular content, it is made to appear as the one (the nation, the order, etc.). We, therefore, should 
not consider ‘society’ to be a valid object of discourse: “[t]here is no single underlying principle ﬁ xing 
– and hence constituting – the whole ﬁ eld of diﬀ erences /.../ [as] necessity only exists as a partial 
limitation of the ﬁ eld of contingency” (Laclau & Mouﬀ e 2001: 111). The social is to be perceived as an 
articulation, not as a self-deﬁ ned totality. Consequently, any binding structure of a collective entity, 
including society as a whole, exists not due to its universal or rational nature but by the merit of 
being opposed to nothingness. In this case, we ﬁ nd ourselves immersed in the pool of antagonisms 
and diﬀ erential relations that exclude the possibility of a totalising unity of the particularities that are 
aggregated.
Notably, “[t]he institution of society is in each case the institution of a magma of social imaginary 
signiﬁ cations, which we can and must call a world of signiﬁ cations” (Castoriadis 2005: 359). The term 
‘magma’, frequently used by Castoriadis, is highly characteristic in this context: magma does not have 
its constant form; it is a viscous and ductile though not entirely ﬂ uid substance in which diﬀ erent 
materials are constantly melted and diﬀ used. Therefore, the need arises for a certain combination, 
contingent as it may be, to be instituted in order to provide it with this more or less stable partial 
ﬁ xation, something that is essential in order to have any meaning at all. Once such an anchoring point 
is established, the lack or antagonism, central to the constitution of the social, is forgotten, and unity 
is ascribed retrospectively (Edkins 2006). A narrative then comes in support, explaining the world, 
suturing and totalising the social. This narrative ﬁ lls the new system with content and allows one to 
identify with it (László 2008).
However, perceiving the nation as a completely imagined community would also be only partially 
true. The nation is ‘modern and constructed but built on prior associations, communities, and 
identities, which in turn were constructed, though at a diﬀ erent time and in a diﬀ erent way’ (Suny 
2009: 280). The nation as an instituted structure draws its symbolic and imaginary basis as well as 
legitimacy from that which exists previously, though in a diﬀ erent form. Here the main questions are: 
(1) which forms, structures and connotations are taken and which are left behind, (2) how they are 
arranged and interpreted, (3) what connections, associations and/or causal chains are retrospectively 
ascribed to them. If a nation is imagined and established successfully, i.e. it becomes an institution, 
then this set of signiﬁ cations solidiﬁ es and starts acting as if it is natural and primordial, a basic and 
universal property of a given entity. In short, it is the tension between the political nomination and 
that which both limits and provides the basis as well as the material for such a nomination. In such a 
case, history and memory become objects of prime importance in deﬁ ning what a particular society 
is and why it is like it is, what are its aims and dangers lying ahead, its boundaries and relations with 
the outside  (Castoriadis 2005). Memory, in its collective mode, is not necessarily something that an 
individual has personally experienced; people internalise events or, rather, particular interpretations 
of events as if they had taken part in them (Berger 2009). Here one encounters a complicated interplay 
between the present, seen in the light of the past, and the past, seen in the light of the present. 
On the one hand, memory could be seen as a mirror that shows diﬀ erence and enables a person 
to perceive him/herself from the perspective of what no longer is (Nora 2008). Memory, then, allows 
the sense of continuity, which immerses the present in a continuum of history and provides the 
present with its creative and constitutive power, shared in groups, and usually heterogeneous, prone 
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to both internal and external contestation. On the other hand, hegemonic practices should not be 
underestimated, since they express cultural and political domination, or, at least, the stability of the 
status quo. In the case of hegemony, the Benjaminian Jetztzeit, the ‘now-time’, should be considered: 
history is then ﬁ lled with this Jetztzeit, the organising structure through which we know history. It is 
“a present which is not a transition, but in which time stands still and has come to a stop” (Benjamin 
1973: 262), a present in which history is written (or which writes history). Thus, nothing has happened 
‘then’ or ‘once upon a time’; everything is happening ‘now’, in the Jetztzeit. Therefore, the analysis 
of dominant narratives is particularly rewarding as it “provides an insight into political community, 
and the forms of temporality and subjectivity that necessarily accompany contemporary forms of 
political authority” (Edkins 2006: 101), especially concerning the meanings attached. They come from 
the current questioning and socio-political needs, as well as from the movement from potentiality 
to actuality, that is, from archives, libraries, museum vaults, etc., to the everyday discourse, gaining 
signiﬁ cance in the context of the present (Assmann 1995). Any supposed order and coherence, 
therefore, masks the fact that nothing in history is historical by itself, but has become such through 
interpretation. One needs to think of history as a contingent constellation of events and meanings, 
consisting of imaginary relations, and dependent on the perspective of observation.
There are several closely connected tendencies to be elucidated for this research. First, the 
tendency to essentialise, i.e. to reduce the whole ethnic group to a single trait or a single set of traits, 
is important. By doing this, it is particularly easy to construct the world of innocent ‘us’ and menacing 
‘them’, of indigenes and aliens, of the titular nation as the ‘chosen people’ harassed by colonisers 
and the ‘ﬁ fth column’. The tendency to totalise must also be mentioned, that is, to capitalise on 
diﬀ erences by turning them, no matter how insigniﬁ cant they may be, into absolute and irredeemable 
ones, thus enabling easier self-deﬁ nition, even if with scarcely any positive content (Smith 1998). It 
might then be added that “true emancipation requires a real ‘other’ – that is, an ‘other’ who cannot be 
reduced to any of the ﬁ gures of the ‘same’” (Laclau 2007: 3). This combination of attitudes proved to 
be self-destructive because once there was no longer any evident threat left, disorientation prevailed: 
there was no possibility to deﬁ ne who we are, only who we are not. This disorientation only proves 
that “I cannot destroy a context without destroying at the same time the identity of the particular 
subject who carries the destruction” (Laclau 2007: 27).
As it was suggested, history and memory are neither conﬂ icting, nor synonymous categories, 
but rather complementary ones. Their meeting point, the Benjaminian Jetztzeit, however, has 
a homogenising tendency as it aims to melt them together into an amorphous whole. Not only 
“much of what we remember about the personal past is suﬀ used with others’ memories – which are 
themselves suﬀ used with other others’ memories” (Freeman 2010: 263), but also a person internalises 
the ‘oﬃ  cial’ discourse of history. This happens through monuments, museums, textbooks, ﬁ lms, 
speeches, commemorational events and other media (Kattago 2009), thus aﬀ ecting and, to a large 
extent, deciding what is to become a part of collective memory. Consequently, it is relatively easy 
to treat imposed memory as one’s own since the particularity of the event tends to be lost in favour 
of communal representation. Furthermore, meanings and narratives are shared and interchanged 
as “there is no speech without a reply, even if it is met only with silence, provided that there is an 
auditor” (Lacan 1977: 40). Individual memories are subordinated to collective ones and only become 
meaningful through them, because individuals themselves produce merely private fantasies rather 
than institutions (Castoriadis 2005). Here we must keep in mind the famous Lacanian formula that 
the unconscious is the discourse of the Other, as “we are condemned to speak our desire through the 
language and desires of others” (Homer 2005: 70). This notion derives its signiﬁ cance from the fact 
that, in the Lacanian theory, it is the unconscious that produces the conscious signiﬁ cation. Having 
said this, it is now possible to move to particular narratives and the analysis of the symbolic structures 
of this discourse of the Other that forms the feeling of sociality and communality.
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History as a unity of martyrs
This part concentrates on the discourse of Lithuanian history textbooks, particularly in dealing with 
the Lithuanian nation and state as such, as well as with the perception of the ‘others’. Particular 
attention will be paid to the restoration of the Lithuanian state between 1989 and 1991. Textbooks 
here are treated primarily as cultural and political artefacts that do not represent the Truth (with 
capital T), but a pretension to truth – indicating a state’s articulation of itself and its neighbours 
(Foster & Crawford 2006). As such, history oscillates between myth-making and myth- breaking, 
especially because national history – didactic, hero-worshipping, and serving as a rallying point – has 
an inherently mythical structure (Lorenz 2011). An attempt has been made to overview the textbooks 
most often used at schools by the respondents of Part 3. Of the currently used range of textbooks 
that were issued between 2008 and 2011, only those for last year students are considered, because 
the respondents ﬁ nished school between 2007 and 2011. However, both the newer and the older ones 
manifest a signiﬁ cant level of ideological continuity.
In general, the importance of history and memory to the imaginary institution of society has 
already been outlined. There still is, however, a need to brieﬂ y concentrate on the myth of origin. If 
politics “is the conﬁ guration of a speciﬁ c space, the framing of a particular sphere of experience, of 
objects posited as common and as pertaining to a common decision, of subjects recognised as capable 
of designating these objects and putting forward arguments about them” (Rancière 2009: 24), then 
emancipation is the reconﬁ guration of the properties that helps introduce new subjects, to “render 
visible what had not been, and to make heard as speakers those who have been perceived as mere 
noisy animals” (Rancière 2009: 25). This is where the need to demonstrate how ‘we, Lithuanians’ 
emerged as speaking subjects originates. Mass demonstrations are among the clearest representations 
of this newly (re)discovered ability to speak, encountered in Lithuanian textbooks. ‘Masses’ and ‘unity’ 
are also important as the ‘will of the people’, which legitimates the new elite and the new order – 
a tendency observed not only in Lithuania but also throughout the whole former communist bloc 
(Pilbrow 2010, Höpken 2007). Images of collectiveness also indicate the process of sense-making, i.e. 
a retrospective structuring of the past in order to explain the present and the future, the eﬀ ort to 
understand the status quo as natural and stable rather than contingent (Bain 2010).
Not surprisingly, dissent in Soviet Lithuania is portrayed in history textbooks as progressively 
gaining strength, a teleological process that had its sole logical culmination with Sąjūdis. Supposedly, 
it only suﬃ  ced for this movement to appear, and “[t]he ideas of Sąjūdis spread throughout the entire 
Lithuania in a very short period of time” (Kaselis et al. 2008: 253, author´s translation), a statement 
immediately illustrated with a photo of a large crowd with national symbols. This unity, however, did not 
necessarily include all the inhabitants: the ‘colonisers’ (Russians) and the ‘traitors’ (Poles demanding 
autonomy) were left out (Civinskas & Antanaitis 2001). This opposition between Lithuanians and non-
Lithuanians is often recalled by associating the latter with anti-independence organisations (Kaselis 
et al. 2008). As the Lithuanian part of society woke up and became active (Civinskas & Antaitis 2001), 
the results followed immediately: the renunciation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was enforced by 
the Baltic republics (Kasperavičius et al. 2001), and “[f]rightened to arouse even deeper discontent in 
the society, the government was forced to tolerate the revived national symbolic; this resulted in an 
unprecedented sally of patriotic feelings” (Kaselis et al. 2008: 254, author’s translation and emphasis) 
and so forth.
Although March 11th and the Act of Restoration of Independence should logically occupy the 
central stage, it is January 13th that provides the discourse with the most vivid images as well as with 
further accounts of unity and self-sacriﬁ ce: “Lithuania raised the single real power against new Soviet 
aggression – national unity and dedication. The nation once again united in the face of aggression, 
thousands of people ﬂ owed to Vilnius to lay their bodies in defence of the centre of the national life 
– the Supreme Council” (Kiaupa 2006: 282, author´s translation). Deﬁ nitely, the events of January 13th 
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united all Lithuanians, and this is illustrated through the use of photos of people with ﬂ ags in front of 
tanks, barricades, crowds and banners near the Parliament and elsewhere, not failing to emphasise the 
unarmed aspect of the resistance and the casualties. Therefore, “a uniﬁ ed position of the government 
and the people”, “eﬀ ective and stalwart support to the government and the Parliament” (Varnienė 
2000: 276, author’s translation) are central to the myth of origin.
Moving forward, it has to be admitted that dichotomy-based thinking, as well as ideas of a pure and 
victimised counterforce, are clear attributes of post-colonial imaginary (Ashcroft 2002). The emphasis 
on the negative thinking of the subalterns, on their tendency to deﬁ ne themselves against others dates 
as far back as the introduction of the term by Gramsci (1992: 54-55): “The history of subaltern social 
groups is necessarily fragmented and episodic. /.../ In reality, even when they appear triumphant, the 
subaltern groups are merely anxious to defend themselves”. For Lithuanians, therefore, the question 
of identity and belonging revolves around martyrdom and exclusion. Lithuanians see themselves as a 
people who, having lived in a multi-national environment, were exceptionally tolerant but constantly 
harmed, both physically and culturally, by their neighbours (Clark 2009). The heroic struggle against 
the Teutonic Knights, subjugation to the Polish inﬂ uence, followed by the prolonged struggle and 
resistance against the Russians (or, later, the Soviets) form the backbone of the Lithuanian national 
narrative, and even upstage the more positive aspects. This forms the image of a ‘nation of innocent 
suﬀ erers’, of perpetual noble victims, proud of their weakness, and constantly on the defence (Clark 
2009).
An analysis of school textbooks shows that collisions and antagonisms permeate the entire 
conception of Lithuanian history. The ﬁ rst models for such thinking can be found as early as the 
formation of the Lithuanian state, which was seen as mobilisation against surrounding enemies 
(Varnienė 2000), and served as a model for future mobilisations. The status of the last pagans, resistance 
to Christianity and outside inﬂ uence, accounts of constant plots and defamations by foreigners (Banys 
et al. 2006) create a self-image of an ‘entrenched’ nation from early on. Attempts are also made to 
‘primordialise’ the nation, with chapters on the Lithuanian nation depicting periods as early as the 
13th century (Kamuntavičius & Kamuntavičienė 2001). It is certain that this is hardly a phenomenon 
unique to Lithuania: such primordialisation is common in post-communist school curricula and 
mostly aimed at solidifying the often fragile bonds of national commonality (Höpken 2007, Vodipovec 
2009). If the nation is seen as having already existed since times immemorial, favourable conditions are 
created for stressing the interventions and negative inﬂ uences, ﬁ rst of all, of the Poles, who inherit 
the status of the enemy from the Teutonic Knights, even more vicious for being silent and deceitful. 
These interpretations vary from explicit claims, e.g. “Conversion to Christianity created a new enemy 
of Lithuanian statehood – Poland” (Kamuntavičius & Kamuntavičienė 2001: 87, author’s translation), 
also expressed through depictions of a whole series of plots against Lithuania, to more implicit ones, 
concentrating on favourable conditions for the penetration of Polish inﬂ uence. Thus, the union 
with Poland is seen as a period of resistance against foreign (Polish) inﬂ uence, when Lithuanians 
“persistently struggled for their independence” (Kamuntavičius & Kamuntavičienė 2001: 87); it was 
only due to this heroic resistance that Poland failed to incorporate Lithuania (Mackevičius et al. 2008). 
Another period of heroic resistance supposedly came after the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth, once again accompanied by a change of the enemy – now incarnated by the Russians. 
Here we once again encounter eﬀ orts to attribute nationhood retrospectively: the Lithuanian nation 
is seen as already having existed before the beginning of the 19th century, so it only needed someone 
“to arouse the Lithuanian spirit” (Kaselis et al. 2008b: 132), to encourage the national consciousness, 
as if these people had always been Lithuanians, just without knowing it, or had forgotten it and 
only had to remember. So it is not surprising that whole chapters are dedicated to the “Lithuanian 
national rebirth” (Civinskas & Antanaitis 2001: 75), although it later appears that it is the formation 
of the nation that is described. A similar pattern has been observed by, for example, Vodipovec in the 
analysis of Slovenian history textbooks (Vodipovec 2009), where a nation is seen as an objective given, 
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devoid of possible conditioning. Furthermore, the resistance to Russian imperial policy is portrayed as 
a well-organised, heroic and all-encompassing struggle leaving no place for contingency (Brazauskas 
et al. 2005), which naturally led to independence (this being a more-than-clear model for future anti-
Soviet dissent). Furthermore, the authors do not fail to emphasise ethnic antagonisms: “Lithuanian 
commerce and industry was in the hands of foreigners”, especially Jews, therefore, “[u]nder such 
circumstances, the activists of the Lithuanian rebirth, concerned with national and economic issues, 
did not restrain from anti-Semitic articles in Lithuanian press” (Brazauskas et al. 2005: 150); therefore, 
even anti-Semitism appears to be justiﬁ ed as the defence of national interests.
Finally, in the 20th century enemies also ﬂ ourish, both on the Polish and the Russian side with Poles 
acting against Lithuanian independence, conducting “routine aggression against Lithuania” (Kiaupa 
2006: 214), leaving Lithuanians, who had only good intentions, as the noble victims. The loss of the 
Vilnius region is converted into victory as only “after the Western countries intervened, the Lithuanian 
army had to cease ﬁ ghting”, therefore, “[a]lthough victory was achieved, the Vilnius region /.../ was 
incorporated into Poland” (Kaselis et al. 2008a: 12, author’s translation). The last struggle is, naturally, 
against the Soviets. It begins with the guerrilla war, seen as a heroic struggle, the gradual decrease 
of ﬁ ghters and intensity perceived as crystallisation of the hard core of true devotees; during this 
struggle, “unduly zealous oﬃ  cials of the occupational regime and traitors were destroyed” (Kaselis et 
al. 2008a: 213, author’s translation and emphasis), thus constructing a new, inner, enemy – traitors – 
and dehumanising them, having them not killed, but merely destroyed. Furthermore, the Lithuanian 
armed resistance is shown as a unique phenomenon (Kaselis et al. 2008a). Once again exceptionality 
through resistance is sought, and comparative martyrology prevails. As was the case in the 19th century, 
resistance to the Soviet occupation is also portrayed as a consciously teleological process, a constant 
struggle between ‘us’ and ‘them’, attributing this struggle to the society as a whole. Certainly, such 
dichotomisation is not a new phenomenon and dates back to Herodotus himself (Lorenz 2011), but in 
this case it is both consistent and expressly pronounced.
All things considered, the martyrology, self-victimisation, and emphasis on the own vs. alien 
distinction, as well as on a supposed founding and legitimising consensus of the people could be 
seen as exceptionally important traits of Lithuanian history textbooks that aﬀ ect the worldview of 
those studying them. Students are provided not only with particular images (as is the case with unity 
at independence) but also with models of self-perception and of interpreting the world, therefore, 
establishing schemes around which the entire reality is constructed (as in the case of aliens and 
enemies), something that has a tendency to correspond with the responses analysed. Even though 
textbooks should not be treated as the only contributing factor and other possibilities and inﬂ uences 
cannot be discarded, the tendencies in educational policies are still illustrative.
Nostalgia, resentment, and decay
The following analysis concentrates on written responses regarding the restoration of Lithuanian 
independence in 1990 and events immediately before and after this landmark date, as well as on 
the understanding of nationhood and nationality. These responses were gathered by the author in 
a qualitative survey of young people born between 1988 and 1992 (conducted by the author from 
February to April 2011). Hence, they were either not yet born when independence was restored or not 
yet conscious enough to possess ﬁ rst-hand experience of the events concerned, therefore, they have 
to rely on other people’s memories. The respondents were social science or humanities students, 
meaning that they undertook an extended history course at school and sat the standardised national 
history examination. No two respondents had studied at the same school and they were originally 
from six diﬀ erent Lithuanian cities and towns.
Remembering Independence, Desiring Enemies: Reﬂ ections on Nationhood in Contemporary Lithuania 23
An attempt is made to understand the perception of inter-group dynamics and relations with the 
outside, imagination of communal bonds, motivation, and the feeling of (dis)continuity reﬂ ected in 
the responses. The semi-structured interviews were conducted in writing – a conscious choice in 
order to obtain responses that would be as little spontaneous as possible. Respondents were given an 
initial set of identical questions that they had to answer in two weeks and then a second set based on 
previous responses, again for two weeks. Respondents, therefore, had the possibility to think about 
their answers carefully, to edit their previous thoughts, and to crystallise their statements in the 
comfort of their homes and without being observed or pressurised. Such submissions can be treated 
as being closer to what is considered by the respondents to be a suitable representation, devoid of 
occasional slips and lapses signalling non-appropriated and disorderly memories, than it would be in 
the case of the more spontaneous oral responses.
Considering the Sąjūdis period, the restoration of independence and the tragic events of January 
13th (the latter apparently being most vivid), there is a clear tendency to adopt the ‘oﬃ  cial’ discourse, 
within which clear-cut distinctions are established and images of unity dominate. Only several people 
conveyed more ‘authentic’ stories of their family’s experience and did not simply recount the dominant 
images. As one of the respondents wrote when asked about her family’s experiences:
My parents met each other while working in Ukraine and returned to Lithuania around 1988. They 
were anxious and did not know what to expect. The tension was especially high during the January 13th 
events and afterwards. My mother was pregnant, therefore, nobody even spoke about going to protect 
strategically important objects, and my father stayed with her. Priorities are simply rearranged in such 
moments and all the talk about patriotism is just words. Even the parents of my father – who were 
especially patriotic – called to persuade him not even to think to stand guard anywhere. Being a father 
now was the ﬁ rst priority, over the love for his homeland.
Similarly, according to another respondent answering the same question, on January 13th:
My father wanted to go to Vilnius, but my mother didn’t let him do that, so he only went to the Telecom. 
But I also remember equally well that my mother talked of calling some of her friends that night and 
the reply was something like “why don’t you let me sleep, who cares that something is happening out 
there”. So I imagine that people were equally divided, some were passionate about what was happening 
while others were indiﬀ erent.
What becomes clear is that the more one attempts to fathom out these personal narratives, 
the more the uniform oﬃ  cial discourse begins to crumble, at least in certain respects, especially as 
far as absolute unity and integrity is concerned. Another person generalised the stories told by her 
grandmother, an active participant in the events of the period:
In these years, it was the same as before: there were many people in important positions, who, being 
party members, used to betray those who strove for independence, but later they suddenly became 
committed patriots. According to my grandmother, talks about independent Lithuania and even one’s 
private position favouring the independence used to create tension and controversies among the 
colleagues.
Here there is a noticeable challenge to the widespread accounts of ‘silent resistance’, of 
unconditional, albeit covert, support for independence (an insigniﬁ cant amount of ‘collaborators’ 
notwithstanding) that made the Sąjūdis and restoration of independence the only logical conclusion. 
The retrospective attempt of many post-communist subjects to style themselves as having been secret 
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dissidents who privately opposed the system, made in order to regain a meaning of their lives under 
new political circumstances (thus, often unconsciously, rearranging their pasts in the light of the 
present) is also challenged (Noble 2010).
However, less authentic accounts were more common, which showed that when a certain 
structure is instituted (and ‘oﬃ  cial’ memory is an instituted symbolic structure), often it is society 
that serves the institution, rather than vice versa (Castoriadis 2005). These accounts varied from open 
disinterestedness, such as:
I forgot the stories because I never listened to them seriously” (interestingly enough, a response from 
a daughter of a signatory of the Act of Restoration of Independence) or “It’s a pity, but I have never 
asked how my mother felt and what she thought during that terrible period when you didn’t know what 
was going to happen
to undoubtedly sincere, but obviously standardised ones. Even those who previously gave more 
personalised accounts (and had expressed doubts about the widespread images of unity), appear to 
have a tendency to perceive the images that coincide with the dominant representations more vividly, 
for example:
My grandmother used to take me to demonstrations, I remember us going down the [Gediminas] Avenue 
to Seimas with ﬂ ags. Probably it was 1991-1992. I remember a lot of people with ﬂ ags. As I was very little, 
I almost did not understand what was happening, I only remember banners, ﬂ ags; I know that I felt 
pride in carrying a small Lithuanian ﬂ ag in my hand.
Other responses were even more generalised and standardised. Interestingly enough, even the 
parents, who had directly participated in the events, apparently tend to communicate the dominant 
images to their children, considering them the ‘right’ thing to tell. So we encounter utterances that 
seek their claim to justice, sincerity and truthfulness in relation to other utterances, model utterances 
that have evaluative power (Bakhtin 1992):
During the Sąjūdis period and several years afterwards, the national feeling was especially strong; as my 
parents say, “the entire Lithuania lived with a single idea, with a single aim”; the strongest desire of the 
whole nation was independence. However, after some time, this spirit waned, personal prosperity more 
and more upstaged the interests of the state; people probably got accustomed to the good life, to new 
conditions of Freedom, and forgot the ideas of Sąjūdis.
This image of initial unity, idealism, and dedication, followed by disintegration, demoralisation 
and decay was clearly dominant. According to the same respondent:
The thoughts people had before and immediately after 1990 were pure and unspoiled by the question 
“what’s in it for me?” which is so common nowadays. Then people were united, they cared about the 
fate of the country, and discontent was very rarely expressed by emigration.
What can be recognised here is a short-lived Golden Age or the Garden of Eden before the Fall, the 
original sin of the new Lithuanian state being greed. It is only after this Fall that decay prevailed. Such 
narratives signal the general attempt to formation of (one-sided) “selves” to cope with the new world, 
either through a ﬂ ood of textbook images and narratives cementing the present via the past (Pilbrow 
2010, Foster & Crawford 2006) that are later fused with other secondary sources and early childhood 
memories where they are available, or through the adults’ own attempts at sense-making that are 
later conveyed to their children. 
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Again, one of the respondents, when asked about the major changes that had occurred, stressed 
that:
Sąjūdis had united a lot of people, in whose hearts hope and a feeling of community were born, and 
this led the nation to independence. The Baltic Way also, I think, is a good example of how not only one, 
but three nations that have the same aim can unite. And now, honestly, we don’t have anything that 
would prove that we care about who we are and how we understand ourselves. The present economic 
migration shows that the system of core values has changed, and nationhood has been left far behind 
material prosperity.
A change of values and interests is, therefore, evident. The nation is seen as having lost its central 
value as it has been emptied of its uniﬁ ed/unifying content:
Before independence, the nation consisted of people, who lived in Lithuania and had a common aim to 
preserve Lithuanianness and to restore the state, and those who lived abroad, created communities, and 
desired independence. I don’t know what the nation is today.
One could easily notice that the general feeling is that of communal bonds being broken, not 
only due to the domination of self-interest, but also due to the general loss of a common aim; once 
the need for resistance was gone, only a void remained. Furthermore, one could notice a certain 
reductionism equating the national bond with governmental policies and well-being in general, when 
asked about the present understanding of nationhood:
The state is not attractive due to its policies in most areas, so it is not surprising that some people see 
no sense in identifying themselves with the country. What patriotic feelings can you talk about when 
people can’t live decently on their salaries and public beneﬁ t is a second-rate issue for the government.
Correspondingly, according to another person:
When thinking about the contemporary understanding of nationhood, I only see the image of parents 
with babies leaving for Ireland or England, or of a poor worker who buys canned food for a month’s work 
in Norwegian construction sites.
Therefore, the contrast between, on the one hand, unity and integrity, strong patriotism, 
altruism, and, on the other hand, the desire for material goods, individualism, disintegration, and 
disinterestedness is obvious. Once again it is the struggle to cope with change that has permeated 
social memory. Also, as Anna Saunders had elucidated in her study of youth in the former East Germany, 
those teenagers who had only little experience of socialism had a much rosier image of it than older 
youths (Saunders 2007). It might be the case that here also widespread societal dissatisfaction that 
young people encounter is contrasted with vague memories and standardised social remembering 
that creates the image of an ideal world. It is an attempt of the subject – or, more precisely, a social 
attempt of multiple subjects – to achieve imaginary coherence and mastery of themselves. Therefore, 
at least in one sense post-communist nostalgia and nostalgia for original unity do have important 
functional similarities.
There is, however, another interrelated tendency in the narratives of change. It could be called 
‘nostalgia for antagonisms’. Paradoxically, even those who previously had given ‘personalised’ 
accounts of the events and refuted the dominant images of unity move to this ‘depersonalised’ plane 
when describing the most important diﬀ erences between ‘now’ and ‘then’:
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Before independence it was easier to identify with your nation because it was possible to contrast the 
own and the alien. Therefore, the aims of the nation, most probably, were articulated more clearly: to 
oppose the existing order and to enable the creation of our own state.
Also in a similar manner, the changes in the understanding of nationhood were expressed as 
follows:
The previous understanding of nationhood could be represented by the events of January 13th: the nation 
unites in order to defend itself from the aliens. The nationhood of today is the parade of March 11th: 
shaved heads, radical slogans, and even louder criticism in the public sphere. The nation does not have 
a single programme.
This adds another dimension to the feeling of disintegration: the need to unite against something, 
i.e. the need of an enemy. Though the alien of the dichotomy is in most cases clearly equated with 
‘Soviet’, further replies tend to broaden this category. Thus, an account that begins as expected could 
later move to a new plain:
After the restoration of independence, there was an ebb that could be related to the feeling of security 
/.../ Furthermore, when the borders were opened, an interest in other nations and their fashions arose: 
Coca-Cola diminished the popularity of Lithuanian kvass, Czech beer became the ﬁ rst preference, 
linen became less important than jeans, holidays abroad became more prestigious than those spent in 
Lithuanian resorts.
So the alien also encompasses the global dimension, often implicitly portrayed as a threat in an 
attempt to reimagine the new reality in old categories:
Until the break, the national feeling was cherished, while now the importance of the nation, its position 
as a fundamental basis of human life, is forgotten /.../ National peculiarity is being lost, we look up 
to the European nations, try to copy them, to catch up with them, but it should not be like this, every 
nation is unique and has to preserve its uniqueness.
The nation is, therefore, imagined as a walled community, which in its ideal condition is self-
suﬃ  cient. Indeed social memory here works as a force that creates and objectiﬁ es groups and 
categories – me/you, us/them – and establishes a system of orientation (Noble 2010). Such memories 
also display a structural similarity with the textbook discourse: the ‘other’ is the fundamental category 
that both threatens and guarantees the existence of the nation and, accordingly, the national subject.
The images of a ﬁ ght being conducted are also similar whatever substance the alien category 
assumes, allowing some respondents to say that no changes in nationhood have taken place:
The aims and activities of those who ﬁ ght for a Lithuanian Lithuania remained similar: ﬁ rst of all, legal 
argumentation that Lithuania had never lost its statehood, that the Soviet annexation was illegal, and 
that the people feel free inside, followed by the instigation of emotions and consolidation of society by 
exalting the peculiarities, traditions, language and customs of the nation by any means possible /.../ 
Now I see a modern ﬁ ght and struggle for the same nationhood, for the same understanding of identity. 
Therefore, Lithuanians are seen as being constantly on the defence, either against malevolent 
plots, or against powerful outside forces and inﬂ uences that tend to pose danger to the nation, 
especially to its monadic ideal. It is also worth mentioning that the Western inﬂ uences are seen as 
both positive and liberating when contrasted with Soviet practices and negative when contrasted 
with the own culture: 
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People started to value their nation, its history, values, to be proud of themselves, and of the nation 
itself. Political changes further strengthened this, as people believed in a diﬀ erent future, were tempted 
by the Western lifestyles that became available. The majority of people started criticising the previous 
Russian system and the Russian nation. I think that the national feeling of that time, of the nation being 
an intrinsic value, now has sharply and painfully declined, people no longer care which nation they 
belong to, what its values are, how one should cherish the national sentiment. This, I think, is highly 
aﬀ ected by the openness of borders, and the fact that nations mix all around the world as people no 
longer identify themselves with a nation or a state. They live where they feel more comfortable.
That is, the destructive potential of outside inﬂ uences is evident in both cases. Interestingly 
enough, sometimes this search for dichotomies appears to be in contrast with the conscious position 
of a respondent, i.e. a person might ﬁ rst employ the dichotomy between the own and the alien, and 
emphasise unity against something, but later add that:
A primitive account of nationhood dominates: making distinctions between the own and the alien, 
limiting traditions to cuisine, community-building through mass events, using national symbols without 
inquiring what they are reduced to, grounding Lithuanianness in falsiﬁ ed history, etc.
Here it is possible to speak of the pervasiveness of the dominant modes of thought and schemes 
of interpretation, their ability to penetrate a subject’s worldview without him/her even knowing it. 
Therefore, schemes and simpliﬁ cations tend to prevail in everyday perceptions. Also clearly perceivable 
is the textbook discourse of the constant need of arousal of nationhood and the permanent need of 
defence from plots and inﬂ uences in order to keep the ever-existing nation pure.
In conclusion, several general trends could be identiﬁ ed. First of all, there was a tendency among 
the respondents to prioritise general dominant narratives of unity, pathos, and unselﬁ sh idealism in 
describing the restoration of independence, as part of them simply relied on pre-prepared images, 
while others, even after remembering episodes that did not exactly ﬁ t into the grand narrative, later 
also moved to well-established images. Secondly, this initial unity and unselﬁ shness is contrasted with 
disintegration and decay that followed. This decay is associated with a decline of moral standards, of 
economic conditions, of the general will to contribute to the well-being of the nation, etc. Nostalgia 
and resentment are, therefore, clearly felt. Finally, this disintegration is almost universally equated 
with the loss of the possibility to deﬁ ne the nation against something. The dichotomy between the 
own and the alien is seen as vital with the category of the alien often encompassing not only the 
Soviet (which is obvious) but also the global dimension. Therefore, the inability of the nation to stand 
united against the global inﬂ uence and to preserve its uniqueness is also seen as a part of the decay.
Conclusion
Czesłow Miłosz, the Polish-Lithunian Nobel laureate, once wrote: “In a certain sense I can consider 
myself a typical Eastern European. It seems to be true that his diﬀ erentia speciﬁ ca can be boiled down 
to a lack of form – both inner and outer. His good qualities – intellectual avidity, fervour in discussion, 
a sense of irony, freshness of feeling, spatial (or geographical) fantasy – derive from a basic weakness: 
he always remains an adolescent, governed by a sudden ebb or ﬂ ow of inner chaos. Form is achieved 
in stable societies” (Miłosz 1981: 67). He was undoubtedly correct. However, the problem is the 
attempt to impose form upon oneself and on others. Eastern and Central Europe is, in more than one 
respect, the Heart of Darkness, where the imaginary and the symbolic collapse, and one is left with 
(The horror! The horror!) of the Real. There is not a single piece of land in the region that had not been, 
at one time or another (or simultaneously), occupied and subjugated. Therefore, it is impossible to 
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speak of any stable system of signiﬁ cations that a modern nation could be built upon. It is on these 
ruins of signiﬁ cation that an eﬀ ort is made to create a stable system of meanings in order to avoid the 
ultimate horror of the Real. It is, therefore, not surprising that particular narratives are invented in 
order to explain the present as non-contingent, and to establish meaning in general.
As it has been indicated, meaning – and particularly social meaning – rests on the ability of 
dominant groups to ﬁ ll empty signiﬁ ers with meaning. In this case, ‘the nation’, ‘order’, ‘unity’, and 
‘liberation’ have to be stressed. As such they have to cement the citizens of the state into the people. 
Memory, therefore, plays a crucial role, as the past has to be constantly seen from the perspective of 
the present, i.e. retrospectively ordered and in some cases forgotten if necessary. As a result, memory 
and (popular) history should be seen as reﬂ ecting the present and not the past: it all happens in 
the Benjaminian Jetztzeit. Notably, the need to deﬁ ne the nation against other groups arises when 
there is no positive content left. It is no coincidence that even the preamble of the Lithuanian 
Constitution deﬁ nes the Lithuanian nation as ‘having for centuries persistently defended its freedom 
and independence’. Also, as seen in the analysis of history textbooks, the entire Lithuanian history 
is narrated through the paradigm of suﬀ ering and malevolent enemy plots. Such is the attempt at 
legitimisation of the present (‘unity’ in the face of threat) and collective sense-making (‘them’ as 
delimiting the borders of ‘our’ community and having deprived us of the full enjoyment of ourselves). 
Consequently, it is only through ‘them’ that the Lithuanian nation is perceived, so we are who we are 
not. Meanwhile, the image of initial unity which supposedly characterised the origins of the new 
state, needed for boosting legitimacy, provides the state with a foundation of a new symbolic system 
almost from thin air. This is a material incarnation of social contract in absence of anything better. 
It explains to the people why they are who they are, and why they currently live in a certain country, 
which is as it is. It is the moment of full sovereignty, a state of exception, out of which a new order 
had appeared, and this order was supposedly given birth not by a multitude, but by a people, thus 
implying a ‘common will’. Not surprisingly, this moment of unity is not only a moment of creation, 
but also a moment of negation, of refusal, of rising against the other. The other is, therefore, vital, and 
its disappearance could result in the disintegration of communality as such or at least in its perceived 
disintegration.
Finally, the respondents’ perception of the past (and present) is evidently in line with the basic 
line of oﬃ  cial textbook narrative with even family memories and personal narratives often being 
subjugated to it. Notably, initial unity, unselﬁ shness, and sacriﬁ ce are contrasted with the current 
materialism and pragmatism. This could be seen as part of the wider societal attempt to cope 
with change and to explain why the present is not an ideal world, and why the post-communist 
transformation has been more diﬃ  cult than initially expected. In this sense, a parallel between the 
nostalgia for communism and the nostalgia for antagonistic unity could be drawn. Also, there are 
two important consequences of the negative creation of unity, present in the oﬃ  cial and textbook 
discourse. First, it is the ‘entrenched’ identity postulating the constant need to defend and protect 
the essentialised and primordialised image of the nation, and the constant need to search for new 
enemies in order to protect such identity. Second, it is the perceived disintegration because of the 
increasing diﬃ  culty to maintain a negative enemy-centred identity in the modern world. Therefore, 
there is a pressing need to search for new strategies of identity-formation that would concentrate on 
who we are and not on who we are not.
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